We provide a methodology to study the role of market distortions on the emergence of indeterminacy and bifurcations. Most of the speci…c market imperfections considered in the related literature are particular cases of our framework. Comparing them we obtain several equivalence results in terms of local dynamic properties, highlighting the main chanels and classes of distortions responsible for indeterminacy. Our methodolgy consists in introducing general speci…cations for the elasticities of the crucial functions de…ning the aggregate equilibrium dynamics of the model. This allows us to study how market distortions in ‡uence the range of values for the elasticity of inputs substitution under which local indeterminacy and bifurcations occur. Applying this methodology to the Woodford (1986) framework we …nd that distortions in the capital market, per se, do not play a major role. We further show that, for empirically plausible values of elasticity of substitution between inputs, indeterminacy requires a minimal degree of distortions. This degree seems to be high under output market distortions, while with labor market distortions the required degree is empirically plausible.
Introduction
Several papers have studied the e¤ects of speci…c market distortions (linked to externalities, imperfectly competitive markets, or government intervention) on local dynamics. 1 However, a systematic analysis within a general uni…ed framework, able to compare the importance of di¤erent distortions for the emergence of indeterminacy and bifurcations, is still missing. In order to …ll this gap, we develop a methodology to study and fully characterize the role of market distortions on the occurrence of local indeterminacy and bifurcations, introducing a general framework that accounts for market distortions without determining a priori their speci…c source.
Market distortions play a role on the local stability properties of the steady state because they modify the elasticities of the crucial functions characterizing the general equilibrium dynamic equations of the model. So our approach consists in generalizing the elasticities obtained when there are no externalities, no government and markets are perfectly competitive, introducing new parameters that represent distortions. We then study how our distortion parameters in ‡uence the values of the elasticities of inputs substitution in production (and of labor supply) under which indeterminacy and bifurcations occur. Most of the usual speci…c market distortions, and di¤er-ent combinations among them, can be recovered as particular speci…cations of our distortion parameters and, thereby, our results can be used to have an immediate idea of their potential role on the emergence of indeterminacy.
Even if our approach can be applied to any dynamic general equilibrium model, we consider here a dynamic framework based on the Woodford (1986) perfectly competitive one sector model segmented asset economy with heterogenous agents (capitalists and workers). 2 In accordance with empirical evidence, we assume that inputs are not weak substitutes, a case where indeterminacy and bifurcations would not occur in the absence of distortions, as shown in Grandmont et al. (1998) . In contrast, with distortions, local indeterminacy and bifurcations (Hopf, transcritical and ‡ip) may occur in the presence of su¢ ciently high capital-labor substitution. Our approach allow us to highlight the main channels through which local indeterminacy and bifurcations emerge. One of the main results is that distortions a¤ecting the real interest rate do not play a major role on local dynamics, while with distortions modifying the real wage and/or consumption and labor supply decisions, indeterminacy may occur even when they are arbitrarily small. However, in this case, indeterminacy requires arbitrarily large elasticities of inputs substitution (and of labor supply). Hence, indeterminacy can only prevail for values of the elasticity of capital-labor substitution around one (those considered empirically plausible) under a minimal degree of distortions.
To illustrate these results we consider examples of speci…c distortions, on output, capital and labor markets, that can be represented as particular cases of our framework. Our major …ndings are that: (i) indeterminacy does not occur with capital market distortions (such as capital income taxation); (ii) indeterminacy requires implausible high output market distortions (such as positive productive externalities or countercyclical market power); and (iii) on the contrary, under labor market distortions (such as unemployment bene…ts with e¢ ciency wages or unions) indeterminacy and bifurcations occur for empirically relevant values of the parameters. Since, as shown in Grandmont et al. (1998) , indeterminacy and bifurcations are linked to emergence of endogenous ‡uctuations, driven by volatile self-ful…lling expectations, our results suggest that labor market imperfections are the most probable cause of endogenous cycles. Hence, our paper fully answers the research question raised in Grandmont et al. (1998) on whether "features such as increasing returns to scale, imperfect competition, and/or sluggish adjustment of wages or prices, alter the dynamics and may or may not improve the range of parameters that give rise to endogenous ‡uctuations".
We also show that several di¤erent speci…c market distortions have equivalent representations in terms of our distortions parameters, and therefore in ‡uence local dynamics in the same way, sharing the same indeterminacy mechanisms. Moreover, some speci…c market distortions correspond to symmetric representations of particular forms of taxation and, therefore, their e¤ects on indeterminacy can be eliminated by using an appropriate …scal policy rule. This result is particularly relevant from a policy point of view, since indeterminacy leads to economic instabilility associated with the emergence of expectations driven cycles.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present our general framework. We study the role of our distortion parameters on local dynamics in Section 3, and apply our results to examples with speci…c market distortions in Section 4. Section 5 provides concluding remarks. Proofs and technical details are provided in the Appendix. 2 
The Model
The dynamic model here considered is based on the perfectly competitive Woodford (1986)/ Grandmont et al. (1998) framework. In order to ease the presentation we begin with a brief exposition of this model.
The Perfectly Competitive Economy
In each period t = 1; 2; :::; 1, output is produced under a representative technology AF (K t 1 ; L t ), where A > 0 is a scaling parameter, F (K; L) is a strictly increasing concave function, homogeneous of degree one in capital, K > 0, and labor, L > 0. From pro…t maximization, the real interest rate t and the real wage ! t are respectively equal to the marginal productivities of capital and labor, i.e. t = AF K (K t 1 ; L t )
A (K t 1 =L t ) and ! t = AF L (K t 1 ; L t ) A!(K t 1 =L t ).
There are two types of in…nitely-lived consumers, workers and capitalists. Both can save through two assets, productive capital and money, the latter given by a …xed amount M at the economy level, constant over time. Capitalists are less impatient than workers and do not supply labor, whereas workers face a …nance constraint which prevents them from borrowing against their wage earnings. Focusing on equilibria where the …nance constraint is binding and capital is the asset with the greatest return, it follows that only workers hold money (they save all their wage income in money), and capitalists hold the entire stock of capital. The behavior of the representative worker can be summarized by the maximization of U C w t+1 =B V (L t ) subject to the budget constraint P t+1 C t+1 = w t L t = M t , where P t is the price of the …nal good and w t the nominal wage at period t, C w t+1 0 the worker's consumption at period t + 1, B > 0 a scaling parameter, V (L) the desutility of labor in L 2 [0; L ], where L is the worker's time endowment, and U (C w =B) the utility of consumption. The solution of this problem is given by the intertemporal trade-o¤ between future consumption and leisure:
where t (L t ) is the usual o¤er curve with " (L) 0 (L)L= (L) 1; 0, and C r , with r high enough, U 0 > 0; U 00 0 for C w t+1 > 0 , and xU 00 (x)=U 0 (x) < 1: All this implies that " (L) 1.
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The representative capitalist maximizes the log-linear lifetime utility function P 1 t=1 t ln C c t subject to the budget constraint C c t + K t = (1 + r t =P t )K t 1 ; where C c t represents his consumption at period t, 2 (0; 1) his subjective discount factor, r t the nominal interest rate and 2 (0; 1) the depreciation rate of capital. Solving the capitalist's problem we obtain the capital accumulation equation
A perfectly competitive intertemporal equilibrium is a sequence (K t 1 ; L t ) 2 R 2 ++ , t = 1; 2; :::; 1, that, for a given K 0 > 0, satis…es (1) and (2), with
Denoting by " X;j the elasticity of the function X with respect to j = K; L evaluated at the steady state, the elasticities of the real wage, the real interest rate and the o¤er curve, with respect to capital and labor, are given by
where " 1 > 0 represents the inverse of the elasticity of (private) labor supply of the representative worker and, for the representative …rm, s 2 (0; 1) is the elasticity of output with respect to (private) capital and > 0 is the elasticity of (private) capital-labor substitution, all evaluated at the steady state. 4 
The General Framework
We now present our general framework with market distortions, explaining and motivating the main di¤erences with respect to the perfectly competitive case. First, in many models characterized by market imperfections, the real interest rate and/or the real wage relevant to the consumers'decisions are no longer equal to the perfectly competitive marginal productivities of capital and labor. This will happen for example in the cases of productive externalities, imperfect competition in the product market or with consumption, labor or capital taxation. Second, with some market imperfections, like in 4 Note that F (K t 1 ; L t ) can be writen as L t f (K t 1 =L t ) so that s f 0 (K=L)K=L=f (K=L) and
. See Grandmont et al.
(1998) for more details.
4 the case of consumption or government spending externalities on preferences, the relevant intertemporal choice of workers becomes a choice between future e¤ective consumption 5 (that no longer coincides with the wage bill) and leisure. Third, with leisure externalities or in the presence of labour market imperfections, such as unemployment bene…ts and e¢ ciency wages or unions, the private o¤er curve derived for the perfectly competitive economy is no longer valid at the social level (see the examples provided in Section 4).
To take these considerations into account, we propose a more general equilibrium dynamic system, given by (4)-(5) in De…nition 1 below. Our approach consists in replacing, in the reduced equilibrium dynamic system (1)-(2), the real interest rate t , the real wage ! t , and the o¤er curve t by three more general functions: % t , representing the real interest rate relevant to capitalists' decisions, t representing e¤ective consumption per unit of labor and t representing a generalized o¤er curve. Since we focus on local dynamics, the elasticities of these three functions play a key role to understand how market distortions a¤ect indeterminacy. We assume that they are de…ned by expressions which are more general than those obtained under perfect competition (see (3)), introducing a set of new parameters ( ij , ij , with i = f%; ; g and j = fK; Lg) that represent a large class of speci…c market distortions.
De…nition 1 A perfect foresight intertemporal equilibrium of our economy, which encompasses market distortions, is a sequence (K t 1 ; L t ) 2 R 2 ++ , t = 1; 2; :::; 1, that for a given K 0 > 0 satis…es:
where
and (K; L) are positively valued and di¤eren-tiable as many times as needed for (K; L) 2 R 2 ++ , such that
5 By e¤ective consumption we mean the argument of the utility for consumption, which in the presence of consumption or public spending externalities on preferences will also include them. 5 where i;j 2 R and i;j 2 R, for i = K, L, and j = K; L, are parameters independent of " and .
As under perfect competition, the dynamics of the economy with market distortions are governed by a two dimensional system in capital and labor, where the …rst equation represents capital accumulation and the second one the intertemporal choice of workers. The perfectly competitive case is recov-
, and the perfectly competitive elasticities are also recovered from (6) with ij = ij = 0 for all i and j (see (3) ). Hence, in each equality of (6), the term ij + ij = 6 = 0 represents market distortions, which add two new components to the di¤erent elasticities: ij which provides a measure of the importance of market distortions when inputs are high substitutes in production ( high), and ij , which become more relevant when inputs are weak substitutes in production ( low).
3 Local Stability Properties 3.1 Non Weak Substitutability of Inputs ( high) Grandmont et al (1998) , assuming that (1 s) < s < 1=2 where 1 (1 ) 2 (0; 1), have shown that local indeterminacy and bifurcations cannot occur under perfect competition if inputs are not weak substitutes, namely if > s. Later on, several works that introduced speci…c distortions in this framework have shown that, with distortions, indeterminacy may occur with su¢ ciently substitutable inputs if the private elasticity of labor supply is high enough. 6 In this paper, considering that inputs are not weak substitutes, we generalize and systematize these previous results, characterizing the e¤ects of market imperfections on the range of values for and " under which local indeterminacy and bifurcations occur, highlighting several important aspects not yet emphasized or obtained in the related literature.
The assumption that inputs are not weak substitutes is plausible. Empirical studies show that the wage bill is increasing in labor, which, in the absence of market distortions, implies that > s and means that consumption is increasing in labor. We extend this assumption to our economy with distortions, assuming that e¤ective consumption ( L) is increasing in labor, i.e. 1 + ;L > 0. From (6) , i.e. 1 + %;K > 0 (see (6) ). Hence, under our assumptions, capital income is increasing with capital, as suggested by empirical works. All these assumptions are summarized below in Assumption 1 and we consider them satis…ed in the rest of the paper.
Assumption 1
1. Small distortions, short period and capital share of output small
Without distortions, Assumption 1 becomes > s > (1 s) with s < 1=2, and indeterminacy cannot occur, as referred above. Hence, the occurrence of indeterminacy and bifurcations in our framework is due to the existence of market distortions, mainly because of their e¤ects through ij , which are more relevant than those through i;j , when inputs are not weak substitutes in production.
Log-linearized System
In order to obtain a full characterization of the local stability properties of the model, we …rst log-linearize the system (4)-(5) around the normalized steady state 8 , obtaining:
7 Notice that the former can also be written as
LL , so that, given LL < s, it will be satis…ed when is small enough. 8 We consider the normalized steady state (K; L) = (1; 1), whose existence is shown in Proposition 9 (see Appendix 6.1).
where hat-variables denote deviation rates from their steady-state.
The local stability properties of the model, being determined by the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix J (or, equivalently, by its trace, T; and determinant, D, as explained below) depend on the values taken by " %;j , " ;j , and " ;j . Distortions in ‡uence the local dynamics of the model by modifying these elasticities relatively to the perfectly competitive case, through the parameters ij and ij . By direct inspection of (7), we may immediately deduce that distortions a¤ecting the % function do not play a major role, since " %;i appears in J always multiplied by , a parameter that takes rather small values when the period of time considered is short. In contrast, distortions a¤ecting the and/or the function can signi…cantly in ‡uence the dynamic behavior of our system. Major di¤erences with respect to the perfectly competitive case are that, with distortions (see (3) and (6)), " ;L may become lower than 1 ( ;L < 0 under large) and 1 + " ;L may take values greater than 1 ( L;L > 0 under large). As we shall see, due to this, and in contrast to the perfectly competitive case, indeterminacy is possible even with arbitrarily small distortions in the and/or the functions when capital and labor are not weak substitutes ( large). 9 We characterize the role of market distortions on local stability properties using the geometrical method developed in Grandmont et al. (1998) 1 T + D = 0, and on the segment [BC], the two eigenvalues are complex conjugates with a unit modulus, i.e. D = 1 and jT j < 2. It can be deduced that the steady state is a sink, with both absolute eigenvalues lower than 1, when D < 1 and jT j < 1 + D, i.e., when (T; D) is inside the triangle ABC. It is a saddle-point, when j1 + Dj < jT j. Otherwise, it is a source (locally unstable). Since K is a predetermined variable (see De…nition 1), the steady state is locally indeterminate when it is a sink. These …gures are also useful to study the occurrence of bifurcations. Considering that a parameter of the model is made to continuously vary in its admissible range (for instance " 2 [1; +1)), a transcritical bifurcation 9 To see this, take as a …rst approximation arbitrarily close to zero, so that D " ;L =(1 + " ;L ). Distortions on and easily allow D to take values lower than 1, a required condition for indeterminacy. On the contrary, under perfect competition this is not possible for large since from (3) " ;L = " > 1 and 0 < 1 + " ;L = 1 + " !;L < 1 for > s > (1 s).
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generically occurs when (T; D) crosses the line (AC) (" crossing the critical value " T ). 10 When (T; D) crosses the line (AB) (" crossing the critical value " F ), a ‡ip bifurcation generically occurs. When (T; D) crosses the segment [BC] in its interior (" crossing the critical value " H ), a Hopf bifurcation generically occurs.
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In our case the analysis of the changes in T and D is quite complex, since we have 16 parameters and the expressions of T and D are nonlinear in some of them. Therefore, to simplify our task, we impose some conditions on the parameters that are veri…ed, not only under perfect competition, but also for most of the distortions considered in the literature (see Section 4). They are formalized in the following assumptions:
where T 1 and D 1 denote respectively the values of T and D when " = 1, and T 1 (+1) and D 1 (+1) denote the values of T 1 and D 1 when tends to +1. 12 Using (6)- (7) and Assumptions 2 and 3, T and D can be written as follows:
(" 1) + T 1 with
10 The case of a saddle node bifurcation is ruled out, since we apply our analysis to (K; L) = (1; 1) whose existence is persistent, under the usual scaling procedure. Also, related works with constant elasticities and (eg. Cazzavillan et al. (1998) and Kuhry (2001) ) found at most two steady states, which rules out pitchfork bifurcations. Hence, for the sake of simplicity we disregard pitchfork bifurcations. 11 The expressions of " T , " F and " H are given in Appendix 6.3.4. 12 Assumption 2 implies that the numerator and the denominator of T and D depend linearly on the elasticity of capital-labor substitution , while Assumption 3, by referring to Figures 1-3 , implies that the point (T 1 (+1; D 1 (+1)) is on line (AC):
For future reference note that, under Assumption 1, D is increasing in " . Also, it can be easily checked that D 1 is a decreasing function of when L > L , with L de…ned below in Assumption 4. Since the inequality L > L is veri…ed in the absence of distortions (i.e., when ij = ij = 0 for all i and j) or when distortions are su¢ ciently small (i.e., all ij and ij su¢ ciently close to zero), being also satis…ed if distortions do not in ‡uence (i.e., when j = j = 0 for all j), and in most of the examples presented in Section 4, we will impose it:
The following Lemma summarizes the previous discussion:
Lemma Before proceeding with the full characterization of the local stability properties, we discuss some necessary conditions for the occurrence of indeterminacy, that will help us understanding the role of distortions on local dynamics. (8)- (9) we can easily see that under perfect competition, when capital and labor are not weak substitutes (i.e. for > s > (1 s)), the …rst two conditions are not satis…ed. Hence, we have the following result:
Necessary Conditions for Indeterminacy
Proposition 1 Under Assumption 1, local indeterminacy is not possible in the absence of distortions.
With distortions, even if they are small enough, this result may be reversed. As shown below, this requires that distortions satisfy the following inequalities:
Let us …rst show that, under Assumptions 1-4, the indeterminacy condition D < 1 requires Assumption 5.1. Since, given Lemma 1, D is increasing
i.e., if Assumption 5.1 is satis…ed. In addition, the condition D 1 < 1, using (9) and Assumption 1, is equivalent to > H 1 , with H 1 given by (18) in Appendix 6.3.3. Hence, we obtain the following Proposition:
Proposition 2 Under Assumptions 1-4, indeterminacy requires Assumption 5.1 and > H 1 (so that D may become lower than 1).
Using also Lemma 1, we have the following Corollary:
Corollary 1 Under Assumptions 1-3, indeterminacy requires Assumption 5.1 and > H 1 whenever any of the following conditions is satis…ed: (i) either distortions are (arbitrarily) small or (ii) distortions do not a¤ect .
A direct implication of these results is that if distortions are su¢ ciently weak and do not in ‡uence the % function, then LL > L is a necessary condition for indeterminacy. Hence, indeterminacy cannot occur with LL = L = 0, and the existence of distortions through labor are crucial when distortions are small.
Let us now focus on the role of Assumption 5.2 for the indeterminacy condition D > T 1. Using (8)- (9) and Assumption 1, note that D > T 1 is equivalent to Using all the results above we can already emphasize the relative importance of each type of distortions. If there are only distortions on %, then from Corollary 1 indeterminacy requires K;K < 0 (Assumption 5.1) and, therefore, from Corollary 2 indeterminacy requires that K;L is above a positive lower bound, given by
2). Accordingly we have the following Proposition:
Results on Indeterminacy and Bifurcations
The full characterization of the local stability properties of the model in terms of the relevant parameters is provided in Proposition 5 and Table 1 below. Our results are derived assuming also that:
This Assumption is always veri…ed if distortions are small enough, only in ‡uence % and/or , or only in ‡uence provided that L does not take large negative values ( L > 2). 13 Hence, in order to simplify the exposition and the analysis, in the following we consider that Assumption 6 is satis…ed.
As explained in the Appendix, our results are obtained using the geometrical method developed in Grandmont et al. (1998) , i.e. we analyzed how T and D evolve in the space (T; D) as " 2 [1; 1), the bifurcation parameter, continuously varies in its admissible range. Note that Assumptions 4-6 imply that we focus on values
14 Proposition 5 Let (K; L) = (1; 1) be the normalized steady state of the dynamic system (4)- (5), as stated in Proposition 9. Consider that Assump- ; +1 take values in intervals speci…ed by referring to the critical values T ; F , H 1 , H 2 , and H 3 de…ned in Appendix 6.3.3., and let " 2 [1; 1) take values in intervals speci…ed by referring to the critical values " H ; " F and " T given in Appendix 6.3.4. Consider further that Assumptions 7 and 8 are satis…ed whenever KK > 0, and that Assumption 9 is veri…ed when KK 0 and L < c L . 15 Then, the nature of the steady 14 A su¢ cient condition for non emptiness of this interval is that distortions (other than those represented by L ), are small enough. Indeed, if
L L for values of those parameters close to zero. 15 These Assumptions are used merely as an exposition device. Assumptions 7 and 8, which are presented in Appendix 6.2 Con…guration (i), are only relevant in the case of state, whether a saddle, a sink or a source, depends upon the values of the parameters L ; KK , and " belonging to the intervals indicated in Table  1 .
16 Also, whenever the critical value " H (resp. " F or " T ) appears in some row of Table 1 a Hopf bifurcation (resp. a ‡ip or transcritical bifurcation) generically occurs as " crosses the corresponding value.
Proof. See Appendix 6.2
We start the discussion of the results with two remarks. First, Proposition 5 does not cover the case of perfect competition, since Assumption 5 can only be veri…ed if there are distortions. Second, distortions a¤ecting only %, through either K;K or K;L , are also not covered by Proposition 5, since in this situation, according to Proposition 4, Assumption 5 is not satis…ed. In any case, as shown in Propositions 1 and 4, indeterminacy would not occur in those situations.
In contrast, from Table 1 , indeterminacy and bifurcations may occur in the presence of market distortions, under Assumptions 1-6. Indeterminacy (sink) requires values of the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor ( ) and of the elasticity of labor supply (1= (" 1)) above certain lower bounds. Of course, given Proposition 2, the lower bound on is higher or equal to H 1 . Also, Hopf and/or transcritical bifurcations are possible in all con…gurations.
There are however di¤erences across con…gurations: (a) The lower bound on required for indeterminacy is equal to H 1 in con…gurations (i) (ii), while it is identical to H3 > H1 in con…guration (iii); (b) Flip bifurcations are only possible in con…gurations (ii) and (iii); However, (c) indeterminacy can only occur through a ‡ip bifurcation in con…guration (iii); (d) Finally, while an upper bound on " is always required for indeterminacy, in con…guration (iii) a lower bound on " may be needed in some cases: when 2 ( H3 ; F ), indeterminacy only emerges for " > " F > 1: The latter result is important per se, since it implies that imposing an in…nitely elastic labor supply at the individual level (" = 1) may not be appropriate to fully understand the implications of market distortions on local indeterminacy. product market imperfections discussed in Section 4.2.1, being veri…ed for reasonable values for and for the distortions parameters (see Table 2 ). Assumption 9 is presented in Appendix 6.2 Con…guration (iii). It is only relevant in the case of labor market imperfections discussed in Section 4.2.3, being veri…ed in all the examples. 16 In Table 1 , when KK = 0, the lines with a * disappear if H2 2 (s LL ) (1+ LL ) ; +1 does not exist, the upper limit of in the preceding line becoming +1: See Appendix 6.2 and 6.4.
and (" T ; 1) We now discuss the role of the di¤erent distortions on the results obtained. We start by noting that, under Assumption 1 the critical value b L , which separates con…gurations (i) and (ii), is negative in the absence of distortions (see (13) in Appendix 6.3.1). Hence, if distortions are small enough we will always obtain con…guration (i). Note also that, in the absence of distortions on , b L becomes equal to 1 for h 0. Hence, since the values taken by are typically rather low, con…guration (i) is also the relevant one when there are only distortions on %, or on , or on both. This is summarized in the following Corollary.
Corollary 3 Assume that Proposition 5 applies. Con…guration (i) is always obtained if: i) either distortions are arbitrarily small, or ii) in the absence of distortions on for a su¢ ciently low :
As already referred, distortions in ‡uencing the % function do not critically in ‡uence local dynamics, a result that is also apparent in Proposition 5. Indeed, within each con…guration, K;K being positive or negative does not change the critical lower bound on above which indeterminacy may occur ( H 1 in Con…gurations (i)-(ii), and H 3 in Con…guration (iii)). In contrast, distortions in the and functions play a crucial role for indeterminacy. In fact, although Assumption 5 cannot be veri…ed and indeterminacy is not possible with only arbitrarily small distortions on % (see Proposition 4), this is no longer the case when small distortions in ‡uence , or , or both. Indeed, in the absence of distortions on %, Assumption 5 is satis…ed with (arbitrarily) small values of L;L , ;L , ;K and L;K , provided they are such that ;K L;K 0, L;L > 0 and/or ;L < 0 and, therefore, provided also that L;L ;L is small and positive. 17 Applying Proposition 5 and using Corollary 3 (condition i), we obtain con…guration (i). Hence, indeterminacy occurs when exceeds H 1 and for below H or T: However, when distortions become arbitrarily small, 18 H 1 ! +1 (see (18) , so that indeterminacy requires an arbitrarily large . In this case " H ! 1 and " T ! 1 (see (21) , (23) 0,and either L;L > 0 or ;L < 0, and the elasticity of capital-labor substitution and the elasticity of private labor supply are arbitrarily large. 17 All the other Assumptions of Proposition 5 are also veri…ed when we only have arbitrarily small distortions in and/or . 18 Note that in this case This corollary, together with Proposition 4 suggests that a minimal degree of distortions is required for indeterminacy to occur with plausible values of the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital. In Section 4 we discuss this minimal degree of distortions for each example considered.
Another conclusion worth emphasizing is that, while distortions on and seem to play a similar (symmetric) role on indeterminacy when they are small, this is no longer the case when these distortions take higher values. Indeed, (non arbitrarily small) distortions on play a crucial role for the occurrence of ‡ip bifurcations. From Corollary 3 we see that in the absence of distortions on we would obtain, for credible calibrations of the parameters (low ), mainly con…guration (i) where those bifurcations are ruled out. Hence, since ‡ip bifurcations are frequently a route for chaos, distortions affecting the o¤er curve may be associated with complex chaotic behavior of capital and labor/employment trajectories.
Finally, two remarks concerning the scope of our results are worth referring. First, our paper only deals with the role of market distortions on local indeterminacy linked to the sink property, i.e. we do not address the cases of static or global dynamic indeterminacy and bifurcations, which may also appear in the presence of some market imperfections. 19 Second, although we only discuss local deterministic indeterminacy and bifurcations, associated with the emergence of deterministic or cycles, we may construct stochastic sunspot equilibria, i.e. expectation driven ‡uctuations, along indeterminacy and/or ‡ip/Hopf bifurcations, 20 as shown in Grandmont et al. (1998) . 21 
Applications
We now present several examples of speci…c distortions that provide microeconomic foundations for the model developed above. Many of them have already been studied in the literature, but not always in a …nance constrained Woodford economy. In Section 4.1 we describe the examples and we repre-sent them according to our general approach, showing that some of them have equivalent representations. In Section 4.2 we apply our results to understand in which cases indeterminacy can occur for plausible values of the elasticity of capital-labor substitution.
Speci…c Distortions and Equivalence Results
For each example, we start by identifying the %(K; L), (K; L) and (K; L) functions. We then compute the elasticities of these three functions with respect to K and L, evaluated at the steady state and, using (6), we identify the parameters ij and ij for i = K; L; and j = K; L as functions of parameters that represent the speci…c distortions in each example. 22 We also emphasize that there are classes of speci…c distortions which have equivalent representations in terms of our distortions parameters. Since market distortions in ‡uence local dynamics through the parameters ij and ij , equivalent market distortions share the same local dynamic properties and indeterminacy mechanisms, even if their economic interpretations are di¤er-ent. Our equivalence results have strong implications. If we estimate the relevant parameters of our general formulation, we will not be able to identify a particular source of speci…c distortions among those, which belonging to the same class, are observational equivalent. Also, even if indeterminacy requires an empirically unreasonable degree of some speci…c distortion, the associated indeterminacy mechanism is not necessarily unimportant, since an equivalent empirically plausible model may exist. Another implication is that simulations of equivalent linearized versions of the model with additive shocks lead exactly to the same trajectories of aggregate capital and labor (in deviations from the steady state) and, thereby, equilibrium cyclical properties of variables that only depend on aggregate capital and labor are, up to the …rst order, identical in equivalent models. Finally, the dynamic e¤ects of one speci…c distortion may be compensated/eliminated by the existence of another symmetric speci…c distortion belonging to the same equivalence class. This last result suggests some policy implications. Indeed, as we shall see below in Section 4.2.2, some forms of taxation eliminate local indeterminacy and endogenous ‡uctuations caused by the presence of consumption externalities, so that distortionary taxes may be defended on stability grounds.
Examples with the same distortion on the real interest rate and the real wage
Here we explore examples of output market distortions. In these examples, the generalized o¤er curve coincides with the competitive one, (K; L) = (L); and the real interest rate and the real wage are a¤ected in the same way, i.e. we have:
where D(K; L) stands for the distortion introduced, so that
Using (6) )). In these papers all markets are perfectly competitive and …rms face a private constant returns to scale technology, but, due to positive externalities that a¤ect the total productivity of factors, returns to scale are increasing at the social level.
Here, we will extend this formulation, allowing also for negative productive externalities so that, at the social level, returns to scale can be decreasing. We consider therefore that production is given by
where (K; L) stands for externalities, K (L) denoting average levels of capital (labor). Since …rms, when maximizing pro…ts, take externalities as given, at a symmetric equilibrium with K = K and L = L, we have
Denoting by " ;i the elasticity of the function (K; L) with respect to i = K; L, evaluated at the steady state, we obtain
Output externalities can also be represented in this framework if we consider (K; L) = Z F (K; L) ; where F (K; L) is the average private level of output. De…ning the elasticity of Z with respect to F , z " Z;F , we obtain
We can see that output externalities are a particular case of positive productive externalities, generating the same values for ij ; ij when " ;L and " ;K are such that z = " ;L + " ;K with " ;L =" ;K = (1 s) =s.
Imperfect competition in the product market We will now emphasize that, from a local dynamics point of view, many models with imperfect competition in the product market are, in fact, a particular case of the previous framework with positive productive externalities, corresponding more precisely to the case of output externalities. Benhabib and Farmer (1994) and Cazzavillan, Lloyd-Braga and Pintus (1998) underlined that this is the case when imperfectly competitive economies are characterized by the existence of …rms that have internal increasing returns (the private production function being homogeneous in K and L of degree 1 + z > 1) associated with decreasing marginal costs (the cost function being homogeneous of degree 1= (1 + z) < 1 in output). However, in these models, the equilibrium markup is constant, while several empirical studies (Bils (1987) , Martins and Scarpetta (1999), Portier (1995) , Rotemberg and Woodford (1991) ) have shown that markups are typically countercyclical. Here, we show that the same type of equivalence exists with models of imperfect competition where markup variability is linked to strategic interactions between producers and business formation. In these models increasing returns are associated with a …xed cost, each typical …rm i = 1; :::; N t producing according to
], where k it 1 (l it ) represents capital (labor) used by …rm i and > 0 is a …xed cost. For the sake of exposition, we focus here on markup variability applied in the context of Cournot competition under free entry (where also the obtained elasticity of output market demand, , is constant, as for instance in Seegmuller (2003) and Dos Santos Ferreira and Lloyd-Braga (2005)). The number N t of producers is determined by the usual zero pro…t condition and the markup factor, at a symmetric equilibrium, is given by t = (N t ) Nt Nt 1 with (N ) 0 (N )N= (N ) < 0. Firms, maximizing pro…ts, choose capital (and labor) such that the ratio of the marginal productivity of capital (labor) over the markup factor equals the real interest rate (wage). At equilibrium, the number of …rms is procyclical, i.e. it is an increasing function of individual (and aggregate) production, and can be written as a function of aggregate capital K = N k and labor L = N l, i.e.,
As a result the markup is countercyclical, and the same distortion D(K t 1 ; L t ) = 1= (N (K t 1 ; L t )) a¤ects both the real wage and the real interest rate. De…ning
. Comparing with positive productive externalities, with output externalities and with models of constant markup, we can state the following result.
Proposition 6 Models with imperfect competition in the product market with countercyclical markup variability (characterized by > 0), as described above, have equivalent representation, in terms of our general framework, to models with positive productive externalities (" ;L > 0, " ;K > 0) when = " ;L + " ;K with " ;K =" ;L = s= (1 s), and have equivalent representation to models with positive output externalities or to models of constant markup (characterized by z > 0) when = z.
In fact, this equivalence can be extended to several other types of imperfectly competitive output markets with markup variability. The equivalence applies, for instance, under free entry with monopolistic competition where aggregate consumption (see Seegmuller (2009) (2000a))) is given by a function à la Dixit-Stiglitz in several di¤erentiated goods, each good being produced under a …xed cost as described above. It also applies to models with taste for variety de…ned as, following Benassy (1996) , the consumer utility gain of consuming one unit of all the N t available varieties of goods instead of consuming N t units of a single variety (Jacobsen (1998), Seegmuller (2008) ). However, in this case represents the ratio between the aggregate price and the price set by a single …rm, instead of representing the markup factor. Of course, the precise functional forms of (N t ), (N ), N (Y t ) and N (Y ) depend on the speci…c model considered.
Finally let us remark that this equivalence must also hold in several di¤er-ent types of macrodynamic models and not only in the Woodford framework, as long as capital and labor demand are derived from (static) pro…t maximization as in our model.
Examples with di¤erent distortions on the real interest rate and e¤ective consumption
The examples considered here are capital market distortions (capital income taxation), labor market distortions (labor income taxation) and output market distortions (consumption externalities). These distortions still do not a¤ect the generalized o¤er curve ( (K; L) = (L)), but now the real interest rate and e¤ective consumption are not a¤ected in the same way, i.e. we have: 
Tax rates on labor and capital incomes are determined respectively by the …scal policy rules
with parameters z i 2 (0; 1) and i 2 R for i = L; K, and where !L and K are respectively the wage bill and capital income, both evaluated at the steady state. Note that z i represents the tax rate at the steady state and that i denotes the elasticity of the tax rate with respect to the tax base. When i = 0 the tax rate is constant at the level z i . Since the unique di¤erence with respect to the perfectly competitive economy is that now the real wage received by workers is given by
instead of ! t and the real interest rate received by capitalists is given by t
instead of t , we obtain:
In the following, we will address separately each type of taxation.
In the case of capital taxation market distortions only appear in the function %(K; L), i.e. D 1 (K; L) = 1: We get j;i = j;i = 0 for i = K; L and j = L; ;
In the case of labor income taxation distortions only a¤ect e¤ective con
Consumption externalities Consumption externalities correspond to the idea that the individual utility of consumption is a¤ected by the current consumption of others (envy or altruism), so that aggregate or average consumption becomes an argument of the utility function (Alonso-Carrera et al. 
Examples with distortions on the generalized o¤er curve
We start with examples where distortions only modify the o¤er curve (leisure externalities and unemployment insurance with e¢ ciency wages) and proceed with an example where e¤ective consumption is also a¤ected (unemployment bene…ts and unions).
Leisure externalities The idea behind leisure externalities is that an individual's utility from leisure (or disutility of labor) is a¤ected by the amount of leisure consumed (or labor supplied) by others. For the sake of simplicity, let the utility function of a worker be written as C w t+1 =B L t L t , where 1 corresponds to the elasticity of the o¤er curve in the absence of distortions, 2 R is a constant parameter and L t denotes aggregate labor, taken as given by individual workers, but modifying their welfare. Since at equilibrium L t = L t , the generalized o¤er curve becomes (K; L) = L + : Solving the model we get ji = ji = 0 for fi; jg = fK; L g; L = K = 0 and L = . This example covers, as particular cases, the type of leisure externalities considered by Benhabib and Farmer (2000) and Weder (2004) , where < 0, implying that the (private marginal) desutility of labor is lower when others also work more. Note that in this case the elasticity of the generalized o¤er curve becomes lower than and therefore it can take values lower than 1, in contrast to the perfectly competitive case. If, for instance, " = 1 and < 0 we obtain " L < 1, as it happens in the model explored in Grandmont (2008) that we present below. Grandmont (2008) introduces unemployment insurance in a Woodford economy with e¢ ciency wages (see also Coimbra (1999) and Nakajima (2006)), distorting only the generalized o¤er curve. There is a continuum of identical workers of mass 1, with disutility from e¤ort, labor is indivisible and unemployed workers receive a constant percentage z of the wage, …nanced by a uniform tax rate on income of all workers, both, the bene…ts and the tax rate, taken as given by individuals. The e¢ ciency wage contracting involves a level of e¤ort, x , and a level of consumption of employed workers, C , both constant over time (depending only on z). Therefore, there is a constant reservation wage at the private level, so that " = 1. In this model, (K; L) is identical to aggregate consumption of employed and unemployed workers, i.e., (K; L) = C n + C (1 n)z, where n = L=x denotes the steady state employment rate. We get " K = 0 and 0
Unemployment insurance and e¢ ciency wages
Comparing this economy with the one with leisure externalities we can state the following:
Proposition 8 Assuming " = 1; the model with unemployment bene…ts and e¢ ciency wages (characterized by 1 > z > 0; n > 0) and the model with externalities in leisure ( < 0) ; described above, have equivalent representations in terms of our general framework when 1 < z z+(1 z)n = < 0.
Unions and unemployment bene…ts We end this section presenting an example with labor market imperfections, where both (K; L) and (K; L) are a¤ected by market distortions. This example is provided by the model developed in Dufourt et al. (2008) that introduces unions and unemployment bene…ts in the Woodford …nance constrained framework (see also LloydBraga and Modesto (2007)). There is a continuum of identical workers, labor is indivisible and workers have no labor desutility. A constant real bene…t b > 0 is paid to each unemployed in t …nanced by a real tax > 0 on each employed worker at t, both being received and paid at t + 1, i.e., b(1 L) = L. Firms …rst decide the amount of capital services to rent and then wages and employment are determined through an e¢ cient bargain between unions and …rms. Agents take b and as given, and unions, willing to maximize the consumption of an average worker, are able to set wages paid by …rms above a reservation wage RW (given by RW t = (b + )
1, increasing in the (constant) bargaining power of unions (1 ) 2 [0; 1). Employment is determined by the equality between the reservation wage and the marginal productivity of labor, i.e., RW t = !(K t 1 =L t ). Note that the case of a perfectly competitive labor market would be obtained with = 1 leading to (K; L) = 1. Capital is determined by the equality between the real interest rate and the marginal productivity of capital multiplied by the …rms'bargaining power, . Recall that money demand in every period t is identical to the respective wage bill ( (K t 1 ; L t )!(K t 1 =L t )L t ) and money supply is constant over time. From monetary equilibrium we obtain
. Hence, given the equations that determine real wages, employment and real interest rates, we are able to identify this model within our general framework, obtaining:
Because of the existence of a constant reservation wage at the individual level, we have = 1 and, since
( 1) ; after some computations we get K;j = K;j = 0 for j = K; L,
Discussing the Examples: The minimal degree of distortions required for indeterminacy
In this section we apply the results obtained in Proposition 5 to the examples presented in the preceding section. In Table 2 we summarize the assumptions and con…gurations obtained in terms of parameters that represent the speci…c distortions considered in each example, focusing mainly on Assumptions 1 and 5. 24 This table only covers the basic examples, the others being easily recovered using our equivalence Propositions.
As referred in Section 3.3, a minimal degree of distortions is required for the occurrence of indeterminacy with plausible values for the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor. Here, using Table 2 and Proposition 23 This means that, in terms of local dynamics, the model is as if %(K t 1 ; L t ) is not a¤ected by distortions. 24 In all the examples presented, Assumptions 2 and 3 are always satis…ed. Also, under Assumption 1, Assumption 4 is veri…ed in all examples, except in the case of leisure externalities where it requires a not too negative degree of externalities. It can also be checked that, under Assumptions 1 and 4, Assumption 6 is also satis…ed in all the examples. Note also that Assumptions 7 and 8 only apply in the case of output market imperfections, and in particular in the case of productive externalities presented in Table 2 , where K;K > 0. Productive Externalities Extending Ass. 1 to
Ass. 7 requires we obtain con…guration (i)
(1 s)
Unemployment bene…ts and unions
We obtain con…gurations Table 2 : Assumptions and con…gurations expressed in terms of the parameters of the speci…c examples 5, we discuss this minimal degree of distortions, focusing particularly in the case of a Cobb Douglas technology ( = 1). Our numerical examples are obtained considering that = (1=1:03) 1 4 and = 0:1=4, which is consistent with most calibrations used in the business cycle literature for quarterly data. Hence, = 0:03475, and we …x s = 0:35, so that (1 s) < s < 0:5, as required by Assumption 1. We organize our discussion grouping the di¤erent examples according to the e¤ectiveness of the speci…c distortions on indeterminacy.
Distortions that a¤ect the real interest rate but not the generalized o¤er curve
In these examples, as distortions do not a¤ect the o¤er curve, by Corollary 1(ii), under Assumption 1 indeterminacy always requires Assumption 5.1.
In the case of productive externalities, indeterminacy cannot occur if externalities are negative (" ;L < 0, " ;K < 0). Indeed, in this case KK = " ;K < 0 and by Corollary 2(i) Assumption 5.2 is also required for indeterminacy. However, this Assumption (" ;L + " ;K > 0) cannot be satis…ed when " ;L < 0, " ;K < 0. With positive externalities 25 , as in Cazzavillan et al. (1998) , Con…guration (i) of Table 1 applies (see Table 2 ) and indeterminacy can emerge for With markup variability we may apply the equivalence result of Proposition 6. Therefore, With capital taxation, easy computations show that Assumption 5.1 implies that KK < 0, i.e. K > 0, so that tax rates vary positively with 25 The reader may check that with positive externalities (" ;L > 0 and (24) is satis…ed and Assumption 8 is veri…ed. capital income. However, applying Corollary 2(i), we conclude that indeterminacy cannot occur in this case since Assumption 5.2 is not satis…ed when
We conclude that distortions on capital or output market per se (see also the case of consumption externalities discussed below) do not seem to be empirically plausible sources of equilibrium indeterminacy.
Distortions that only a¤ect e¤ective consumption
In these examples distortions do neither a¤ect the o¤er curve nor the real interest rate. Therefore, by Corollaries 1 and 2, indeterminacy always requires Assumptions 5.1 and 5.2.
With labor income taxation, both assumptions are only satis…ed if L < 0; implying that indeterminacy does not occur when tax rates are constant or vary positively with the tax base. For L < 0, as we obtain con…guration (i) (see Table 2 ), indeterminacy occurs for
, provided that the elasticity of labor supply is high enough (see Table 1 ). 26 For instance, when L = 1 27 and z L < 0:5 so that Assumption 1 (See Table 2 ) is veri…ed, indeterminacy can emerge with Using the equivalence result of Proposition 7 between labor income taxation and consumption externalities, we see that in this last case Assumption 1 implies < 1 and indeterminacy only occurs for > 0. Hence, indeterminacy is only possible when consumption externalities are of the "keepingup with the Joneses" type, occurring for > H1 = [s(1+ ) (1 s)]= . Under our calibration, indeterminacy with a Cobb-Douglas technology emerges for 1 > > [s (1 s)]=(1 s) = 0:5037, which seems to be an excessive value. Indeed, although empirical values for these type of externalities do not seem to exist, Maurer and Meier (2008) found signi…cant peer e¤ects within several di¤erent groups of individuals, but in any case lower than 0.44. However, even if consumption externalities in our setup do not lead to indeterminacy under empirically relevant situations, we should notice that the indeterminacy mechanism involved is important since it is equivalent to 26 Note that in this example, as in all the following ones, H L = L : Therefore H2 does not exist (see Appendix 6.4, with KK = 0) so that footnote 16 applies. 27 This corresponds to the case of a constant real government spending considered in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997) for a Ramsey model, and in Pintus (2003) and Gokan (2005) for a Woodford model. labor income taxation, a distortion that may lead to indeterminacy under relevant parameterizations, as shown above.
We will use this equivalence result to show that taxes may be used as stabilizers, i.e., we show below that labor income tax rates, that vary positively with the tax base, are able to eliminate indeterminacy due to the presence of positive consumption externalities, insulating therefore the economy from belief driven ‡uctuations. To see this consider a model where we have simultaneously consumption externalities with > 0 and labor taxation. In this case we obtain j;i = j;i = 0
; the government is able to set at zero all the distortion parameters, i.e., it is able to recover the perfect competition framework where indeterminacy, and therefore cycles driven by self-ful…lling volatile expectations, do not emerge. For example for = 0:52, as referred above, indeterminacy would emerge in the Cobb-Douglas case when there is no taxation. However, choosing combinations of L and z L such that 
Distortions that a¤ect the generalized o¤er curve but not the real interest rate
Since in these examples distortions do not a¤ect the real interest rate, by Corollary 2 (iii), indeterminacy always requires Assumption 5.2.
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With leisure externalities, where only the parameter L is a¤ected, Assumption 5.2 implies that = L < 0, which also ensures Assumption 5.1. Note also that, since > 1 under Assumption 4 and " 1, we have 0 < " L = " + < 1; i.e. the generalized o¤er curve is still positively sloped (See (6)). In this example
, where b L < 1 < 0, covering some parameterizations of con…gurations (i) and (ii). See Table 2 . Hence, from Proposition 5, and assuming for simplicity that " = 1; indeterminacy may emerge with = 1 when < 1 : Under our calibration, we obtain 1 ' 0:33, a value that does not seem to be exaggerated. Even though we 28 do not have empirical estimates for the degree of leisure externalities, note that this value is signi…cantly closer to zero than the values used in related literature, as for instance the value = 1:23 considered in Benhabib and Farmer (2000) . Using the equivalence result of Proposition 8 between leisure externalities and unemployment insurance with e¢ ciency wages, we see that in this last case indeterminacy occurs with = 1 if z z+(1 z)n < 0:33. We can see that for empirically plausible values of n and z indeterminacy occurs. For instance, if the employment rate is n = 0:95, indeterminacy occurs as soon as the replacement ratio z is higher than 0:32, covering the case of most developed economies.
Note that in these examples
In the example with unemployment bene…ts and unions, based on Dufourt et al. (2008), Assumption 5.2 required for indeterminacy is always satis…ed, and so it is Assumption 5.1. One can check that H1 = s < 1 and that F = 1
, indeterminacy prevails when = 1, independently of the degree of union power. This result shows that the existence of …nanced constrained workers together with unemployment bene…ts, a situation characterizing many developed economies, is likely to create indeterminacy and also complex employment ‡uctuations through the occurrence of Hopf and ‡ip bifurcations.
We conclude that with plausible labor market imperfections, either leisure externalities, unemployment bene…ts or labor income taxation, indeterminacy emerges under reasonable degrees of capital-labor substitution.
Concluding Remarks
With our general analysis of the role of market distortions on local dynamics and the di¤erent examples of speci…c distortions presented above, we were able to emphasize several interesting results, some of them already latent in previous works, but which are here con…rmed, generalized and highlighted. First, our work enabled us to …nd classes of speci…c distortions within which equivalence results are obtained. Speci…c distortions belonging to the same class are observational equivalent and have the same consequences in terms of the local dynamic behavior of (cyclical) aggregate capital and labor. Second, capital market distortions per se do not seem to play a major role for the occurrence of indeterminacy. On the contrary, bifurcations and indeterminacy emerge under labor market rigidities, without imposing strange or implausible restrictions, whereas for output market distortions, indeterminacy requires conditions that might be considered less relevant from an empirical point of view. These …ndings suggest that the functioning of la-bor markets, which in the real world show signi…cant deviations from the competitive paradigm, may be responsible for the persistency along business ‡uctuations and for the existence of expectation driven cycles. 29 Further analysis on this issue is therefore important for future research.
A possible explanation for these results may be linked to the fact that future expectations, which open the room for ‡uctuations driven by selfful…lling expectations, only a¤ect the current decisions of consumers/workers, rendering distortions that a¤ect the intertemporal trade-o¤ of consumers/workers more important than those a¤ecting the capital accumulation equation. 30 Strategic considerations by …rms owning productive capital, which are usually disregarded, may render future expectations of capitalists/producers relevant, and change the results. Although some works have already considered some of these aspects, 31 further research on this issue is welcome. 2007) show quantitatively that labor market frictions constitute one of the most promising mechanisms through which shocks on fundamentals lead to business ‡uctuations. 30 Indeed, in all the usual macrodynamic frameworks, including the Ramsey and overlapping generations models, …rms just rent productive capital, accummulated from past savings of consumers/capitalists, so that future expectations do not directly in ‡uence capital accumulation. 31 See for instance d 'Aspremont et. al (2000) .
Local Dynamics -Proof of Proposition 5
Our proof of Proposition 5 is based on the geometrical method developed in Grandmont et al. (1998) . We consider that s and are …xed throughout the analysis and, for given di¤erent values of ij and ij satisfying all the Assumptions considered, we study how (T; D) change as " and vary in their admissible ranges.
The half-line
We start by discussing how T and D move in the space (T; D) as " is made to continuously change. From (8) and (9) 
Note that the half-line shifts when changes, because its slope S and its initial point (T 1 ; D 1 ) depend on .
The next Lemma, that can be easily proved using (10), Assumption 1 and simple analytical computations, will help us understanding why results are di¤erent according to whether KK 0 or KK > 0. 
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The half-line 1 Let us now discuss the behavior of (T 1 ; D 1 ) as varies. From (8) and (9), the locus of points (T 1 ( ); D 1 ( )) obtained as decreases from +1 to (s LL )=(1+ LL ) describes a half-line 1 , starting for = +1
, and pointing upwards as decreases (since D 1 is decreasing in , see Lemma 1) . The slope of the half-line 1 , S 1
, is given by: The next Lemma will help us understanding why results may be di¤erent in the three di¤erent con…gurations considered for L. (17) in Appendix 6.3.2, the following holds:
, where S B is the slope of 1 when 1 goes through point B;
(iii) For L < c L ; S 1 2 (S B ; 0): P roof : First note that, given the de…nitions of the critical values of L in Appendix 6.3.1, S 1 can be written as in (11) but also in several di¤erent ways (see (14) - (16)). Under Assumption 4, L > L and the numerator of S 1 in (11) is negative, given Assumption 1. Hence, under Assump-
Using (14) we can see that, given Assumption 5.2, S 1 = 2 (0; 1) and we obtain S 1 > 1 for L a L . Also, using (15), we see that, under Assumption 1,
L . This proves Lemma 3.(i). Note also that, using (11) and (15) and (11) . We now show that this root must be c L . Indeed, using (16) and (15), and since S B 2 ( 1; 0) under the Assumptions of Lemma 3 (see (17)), we have that the inequality 
(ii) and (iii).
We now characterize the local stability properties of the steady state for each con…guration de…ned in Lemma 3. We use geometrical arguments whenever possible, by referring to Figures 1-3 . For any given con…guration, remember that the half-line , which starts for " = 1 on half-line 1 , points upwards to the right as " increases from 1 to +1. Also, as decreases from +1 to (s LL ) = (1 + LL ), the half line becomes less steep (see (10) ) and its initial point (T 1 ; D 1 ) moves upwards along the half line 1 (D 1 is decreasing in , Lemma 1). Recall also that the half-line 1 always start for = +1 on line (AC) between points A and C, due to Assumptions 3, 5.1 and 6. Finally remember that the half-line 1 points upwards as decreases from +1 to (s
The critical values of L , and " used below are given in Section 6.3.
Using Lemma 3, we have jS 1 j > 1. Therefore, the half-line 1 that starts on the line (AC), between A and C, points upwards with a slope S 1 strictly greater than 1 or strictly smaller than 1, crossing neither (AB), nor (AC) (see Figure 1) (18) ). If H 1 , the half-line starts on 1 above [BC] and since it points upwards to the right, it crosses the line (AC), above point C, for " = " T . Accordingly, the steady state is a source for 1 " < " T , undergoes a transcritical bifurcation for " = " T and becomes a saddle for " > " T . If > H 1 , (T 1 ( ); D 1 ( )) is inside the triangle (ABC) and the half-line must also cross the line (BC), but Hopf bifurcations only occur if the crossing point is on the left of point C, so that the half-line crosses [BC] in its interior. We can see geometrically that, by continuity, for higher but close to H 1 the half-line crosses the segment [BC] in its interior. However, for higher values of > H 1 this may not happen. Let us de…ne H 2 2 ( H 1 ; +1) as a critical value for such that the half line goes through point C.
Consider …rst that KK < 0, which means that S < 1 and that lim !+1 S < 1 (see Lemma 2) . In Appendix 6.4 we show that H 2 is unique and for > H 2 the half-line crosses …rst (AC) below point C, crossing (BC) on the right of point C so that no Hopf bifurcations occur, while the reverse occurs for H 1 < < H 2 .
When KK = 0, we still have S < 1, although lim Assuming now that KK > 0, there exists the critical value T > (s LL )=(1 + LL ) for such that S ( T ) = 1 and S > 1 for > T (see Lemma 2) . To simplify the exposition we assume that:
where F is introduced for further reference and is such that the half-line 1 crosses line (AB), i.e., 1 + D 1 ( F ) + T 1 ( F ) = 0 (see (19) . This Assumption implies that for T the half-line starts within the triangle (ABC) and points upwards with a slope higher than 1. Hence, when T , the half-line only crosses [BC] on the left of point C. For T > > H 1 we further assume that:
This Assumption means that H 2 2 ( H 1 ; +1) does not exist and is ensured if (24) of Appendix 6.4 is satis…ed. It implies that, when H 1 < < T , the half-line crosses …rst the segment [BC] and then line (AC) above C.
b L ) Using Lemma 3, we have that S 1 2 ( 1; S B ). Therefore, in this con…guration, the half-line 1 points upwards to the left, crossing line (AB) above point B for = F (see Figure  2) .
Consider …rst that KK 0 so that S < 1 (see Lemma 2) . When < F , (T 1 ( ); D 1 ( )) is below line (AB) and above B. Since the half-line points upwards it does not cross [BC], but crosses (AB) before crossing (AC). When Consider now that KK > 0. In this case, the critical value T > 0 exists and, as in the previous con…guration, we consider Assumption 7 so that T > H 1 > F : Therefore, for < H 1 , S is still smaller than 1 and we obtain the same results as before. When H 1 < < T , (T 1 ( ); D 1 ( )) is inside the triangle (ABC) and, under Assumption 8, the half-line crosses …rst [BC] , and then (AC) above point C. When T , S becomes greater than 1, which means that only crosses [BC] .
Using Lemma 3, we have that S 1 2 (S B ; 0), with S B 2 ( 1; 0). Therefore, the slope S 1 is negative and greater than 1, and the half line 1 , that points upwards to the left, crosses line (AB) below point B (see Figure 3) . In this con…guration, a new critical value, H 3 , the value of such that the half line goes through point B; becomes relevant. In Appendix 6.5 we prove that in this con…guration, there exists a unique critical value H 3 2 ( H 1 ; F ) such that the half-line goes through point B and crosses [BC] on the right of B for > H 3 .
We begin by assuming K;K 0, so that S < 1. Recall now that when
exists (its existence is always ensured when K;K < 0, see Appendix 6.4) the half-line crosses (BC) on the left of C for < H 2 and on the right of C for > H 2 . We can now see, geometrically, that although in Con…guration (ii) H 2 > F , in the current con…guration if H 2 exists it may be higher or lower than F . To simplify the exposition we consider the following Assumption:
Hence, for < H 3 , starts on the left-side of line (AB), crosses line (AB) above B and then crosses line (AC). For H 3 < < F , also starts on the left-side of (AB), but crosses (AB) below B, the segment [BC], and (AC) above C. Then, for 
b L is such that S 1 b L = 1 and, using (12) , is given by:
c L is the lower root of equation S 1 = S B (see (16) ), where S B is given in (17) . The other root is noted c+ L .
6.3.2 Expressions for S 1 in terms of critical values of L S 1 ; given in (11) , can also be written as: 
where S B is the slope of 1 when 1 goes through point B = ( 2; 1), satisfying S B 2 ( 1; 0) under Assumptions 1, 5.1 and 6, and being given by:
6.3.3 De…nitions and expressions for critical values of H 1 is the critical value of such that D 1 ( H 1 ) = 1 and is given by:
H 2 is a critical value of such that the half-line goes through the point (T; D) = (2; 1), i.e., goes through point C. 32 Note that " T = " H for = H 2 .
H 3 is the critical value of such that the half line goes through the point (T; D) = ( 2; 1), i.e., goes through point B.
33 Note that " F = " H for = H 3 .
The critical value F is de…ned by 1 +
. (19) T is the value of for which S = 1,
Expressions for critical values of "
" H is such that D = 1, which is equivalent to:
" F is such that 1 + T + D = 0. After some computations, we obtain:
" T is such that 1 T + D = 0. After some computations, we obtain:
32 In Appendix 6.4, we show conditions for its existence and uniqueness. 33 In Appendix 6.5 we we show conditions for its existence and uniqueness. 38 
Existence of H 2
First recall that H 2 is a value of such that the half-line line goes through point C, i.e., such that H = T (see (21) and (23)). Further notice that if H 2 exists it must be such that H 2 2 ( H 1 ; +1) . Indeed, we can see geometrically that for < H 1 the half line starts above the line (BC) and, since it points upwards to the right, if it crosses line (AC) it does so above point C.
Consider …rst the case where K;K < 0. In this case, S 2 (0; 1) for S 2 (0; 1) (see Lemma 2) . Hence, for slightly higher that H 1 the half line crosses …rst (BC) and then it crosses (AC) above point C, i.e., H < T . Since lim !+1 S 2 (0; 1), we can see geometrically that a solution H 2 2 ( H 1 ; +1) must exist and the number of these solutions is odd. Since the equation H = T is a polynomial of degree 2, i.e. has at most two solutions, we deduce the uniqueness of H 2 , such that H < T for H 1 < < H 2 , and H > T for > H 2 .
Consider now that K;K = 0. In this case, we still have S 2 (0; 1) ; +1 , i.e., the half line cannot cross point C and always go through (AC) above point C. Therefore, we obtain H < T for all 2 Finally, consider that K;K > 0. Since under Assumption 7 T > H 1 , we have S 2 (0; 1) for 2 [ H 1 ; T ), and S > 1 for > T , with lim !+1 S > 1 (see Lemma 2) . We can see that for slightly higher than H 1 the half line crosses (BC) on the left of C and (AC) above point C, i.e., H < T . If there is a solution H 2 to H = T it has to satisfy H 2 2 ( H 1 ; T ). Since S > 1 for > T , the half line crosses (BC) on the left of C, the existence of H 2 2 ( H 1 ; T ) is not ensured and the number of solutions H 2 2 ( H 1 ; T ) that satisfy H = T must be even. The equation H = T is equivalent to g( ) = 0, where:
Under Assumptions 1 and 5, this function describes a convex parabola with g( H 1 ) > 0, g( T ) > 0 and g(+1) = +1. Hence, either g( ) = 0 has two solutions (requiring g 0 ( H 1 ) < 0) or none (as it happens for instance when g 0 ( H 1 0) ). As g 0 ( H 1 ) 0 is equivalent to:
when this inequality is satis…ed, there is no solution to g( ) = 0. 34 This implies that for all > H 1 the half-line always goes above point C and that, in particular, Assumption 8 is satis…ed.
Existence of H 3
Using (21) and (22) 
By de…nition, H 3 is a value of such that H = F ; therefore it must be a solution of h( ) = 0. Since h( ) is a polynomial of degree 2, the equation h( ) = 0 has at most two solutions. We limit our analysis to con…guration (iii) since H 3 is only relevant under this con…guration. Since is positively sloped pointing upwards, it can only go through point B if its initial point in 1 is on the left of line (AB), i.e., H 3 < F . Also, the polynomial h( ) is a convex function of since the coe¢ cient of the quadratic term 2 is positive. 35 We can see geometrically that if there is a H 3 > [51] Woodford, M., (1986), "Stationary Sunspot Equilibria in a Finance Constrained Economy,"Journal of Economic Theory, 40, 128-137. 
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